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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

TEACHING MARITIME LAW:
REFLECTIONS OF A NEAR LIFETIME
FRANK L. MARAIST*
INTRODUCTION
These comments explore the “why” and “how” of teaching admiralty law
from the viewpoint of one who has been involved with the task for much of a
long lifetime. There are certainly others more learned in the subject of
admiralty law and more skilled in teaching it to law students. However, my
experiences as a practicing attorney and as a classroom teacher in the subject at
five law schools for over a forty-year span have given me some opinions on
how maritime law can be taught generally to a law student.
When first offered this assignment, I thought that it would be fairly simple
to write about how admiralty law should be taught. Several rewrites have
shown me that it probably is easier to teach admiralty law than to suggest to
others how it should be taught. This final effort addresses why we teach
admiralty law in a law school setting, what it is that we teach, when in a law
school curriculum it should be taught, and some potential ways to teach it.
The first observation—why professors teach admiralty law—should begin
with an understanding of what is the role of admiralty or maritime law1 in
American law. One perhaps should first explain how to avoid misnomers. The
subject often is referred to, erroneously, as the “Law of the Sea.” However,
the term “Law of the Sea” generally encompasses the international law and
national law that govern the use of the high seas and their resources by nations
and the regulation of high seas shipping. Admiralty law does involve the law
governing occurrences at sea, but is not limited to the traditional disputes
arising out of the transportation of cargo and the care of passengers and “blue
water” seamen from one nation to another. American admiralty law includes
tort and contract law that can impact the claims of persons and property many
miles from the sea, and in many cases it does not concern the transportation of
goods over water. The general maritime law, as opposed to the “Law of the
Sea” and American admiralty law, is a synthesis of the rules that generally
* The author thanks Tom Galligan, Catherine Maraist, and Bill Corbett, his co-authors in
maritime and other treaties, for their helpful comments.
1. The terms “admiralty” and “maritime” generally are used interchangeably, at least as to
legal issues.
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regulate maritime commerce between seafaring nations. American admiralty
law is primarily federal law, and thus, it impacts and often supersedes the
effect of state law upon the resolution of other diverse American legal issues.
Those issues might involve gambling on a houseboat far inland or injury to a
water skier on the ocean (or on an inland lake, or on a stream a thousand miles
from the ocean shores of the United States) or an explosion on an oil-drilling
platform a hundred miles from those shores.
These examples illustrate the first point—why admiralty or maritime law
should be a staple in United States law schools. The reason, primarily, is that
American admiralty law has become a third jurisdiction to American
lawyers—one that often will supplant other federal or state law. The practicing
lawyer or judge need not necessarily be skilled in all of the innuendoes of this
third jurisdiction. But to avoid malpractice or judicial error, he or she must be
aware that such jurisdiction may exist in a certain matter and that its dictates
could resolve the issue in a particular case. In these cases, federal law
preempts otherwise applicable state law or foreign law.
The teaching of admiralty must begin with an explanation of the source of
American admiralty law—a clause in the United States Constitution2 that
apparently was designed to provide a forum for multi-state or multi-national
conflicts that impact maritime shipping and commerce. That constitutional
provision for a federal forum soon became a springboard to federal substantive
law, long before the interstate Commerce Clause of the federal Constitution
received its broad reach. At a time before the state and national road systems
were developed, goods moved on water, and the provision of federal
jurisdiction over that transportation was critical to the development of both a
strong federal government and coherent, consistent rules for domestic and
international American commerce.
However, the comprehensive nature of American admiralty law had its real
genesis in United States Supreme Court decisions that defined navigable
waters as any waters that, alone or in conjunction with other streams, can serve
as a highway of commerce between two or more American states or between
an American state and a foreign nation,3 and other Supreme Court decisions

2. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (“The judicial Power shall extend . . . to all Cases of
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction”).
3. See, e.g., The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 439 (1874) (defining a river as
navigable “when it forms by itself, or by its connection with other waters, a continued high-way
over which commerce is, or may be, carried with other States or foreign countries in the
customary modes in which commerce is conducted by water”); The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10
Wall.) 557, 563 (1870) (“Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law which
are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when they are used, or susceptible of being
used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or
may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water.”). See also Foremost Ins.
Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 674 (1982) (finding that cases involving the negligent operation
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that expanded the constitutional provision from a grant of judicial competence
to a federal power to provide substantive law.4 As a result of this
jurisprudence, American maritime law applies generally to the Atlantic and
Pacific Oceans, the Gulf of Mexico, the Great Lakes, and the Caribbean Sea.
But most importantly, it applies to an inland lake between two states and to an
inland stream connected to oceans a thousand miles away, that can be reached
by those oceans with a form of water transportation. And it also means that if
the matter is within the federal constitutional power over maritime matters,
Congress and, in its default, the courts, may determine the substantive law that
controls.5
Thus American maritime law is both comprehensive and preemptive. It
also is fluid. Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution provides both
legislative and judicial power.6 If a federal statute is enacted under Article III,
Section 2, it preempts any otherwise conflicting state law.7 Even if there is no
federal statute, the court may determine that the matter is “in admiralty” and
apply a jurisprudential rule that differs from otherwise applicable state law.8
Nearly every lawyer must be aware of the possibility that a particular conflict

of a vessel have a sufficient connection to traditional maritime activity, a class of activities that
includes maritime commerce, to support admiralty jurisdiction).
4. See, e.g., Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 360–61 (1959) (noting
that Article III, Section 2, Clause 3 “empowered the federal courts in their exercise of the
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction which had been conferred on them, to draw on the
substantive law ‘inherent in the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction’”) (quoting Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 55 (1932)); Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372, 382 (1918)
(finding that states have no authority to change the general maritime law by operation of Article
III, Section 2, Clause 3); S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215 (1917) (citing Workman v.
New York City, 179 U.S. 552 (1900); Butler v. Bos. Savannah S.S. Co., 130 U.S. 527 (1889);
The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558 (1874)) (“[I]n the absence of some controlling statute,
the general maritime law, as accepted by the Federal courts, constitutes part of our national law,
applicable to matters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.”).
5. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 489–90 (2008) (“[M]aritime law, . . .
falls within a federal court’s jurisdiction to decide in the manner of a common law court, subject
to the authority of Congress to legislate otherwise if it disagrees with the judicial result.”).
6. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. See Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 386
(1924) (concluding that “there is no room to doubt that the power of Congress extends to the
entire subject and permits of the exercise of a wide discretion”); Butler, 130 U.S. at 557 (arguing
that the Constitution’s grant of admiralty jurisdiction extends to both the judiciary and legislative
branches).
7. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 62–63 (2002) (evaluating the wording of a
preemption clause before determining that while the clause clearly preempted state laws and
regulations, it did not preempt the state common law).
8. See Jensen, 244 U.S. at 217 (upholding a lower court’s finding that the death of a
stevedore on land while unloading a boat was “maritime in its nature,” and finding that the
uniformity requirements of admiralty made the state worker’s compensation statute invalid).
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may fall within admiralty jurisdiction and must consider the impact of that
jurisdiction over the outcome.
Moreover, the well-trained American law student and the practicing lawyer
must not only know when a case may fall within admiralty jurisdiction, but
also the law that admiralty jurisdiction may provide. At the same time, he or
she must also know what the otherwise applicable state or federal law would
provide. The student or lawyer must be able to argue that, although the case
has a “salty flavor,”9 it may not be maritime, and thus, other federal law or
state law generally will govern. He or she must understand that even though
the matter is “in admiralty,” where there is no established American maritime
law, the court must either establish such law or apply state law (the “maritime
but local” doctrine),10 and, where there are multi-state contacts, that court must
determine which state’s law should apply. He or she must be aware that some
maritime claims may only be brought in federal court, sometimes without a
jury, and that whether the claim is asserted in federal court or state court, if the
matter is “in admiralty,” American admiralty law applies.11 Finally, he or she
must be aware that the substantive American admiralty rules governing the
claims may vary greatly from otherwise applicable state law. One classic
example is the statute of limitations. Nearly every state has statutes of
limitation that may conclusively bar a claim. However, if the matter is “in
admiralty,” there may be a different statute of limitations or, in some cases, no
statute of limitations at all, taking the lawyer to the concept of laches.12
In sum, to the law student, lawyer, and jurist, knowledge of the rudiments
of American admiralty law is essential in evaluating the case and in avoiding
malpractice and judicial error.
The study of American admiralty law exposes the neophyte lawyer and law
student to an overwhelming number of concepts that he or she must master, or
at least understand, to achieve success as a lawyer. The first of these, of
9. Justice Harlan once famously declared that a case involving an insurance contract on a
houseboat had “a more genuinely salty flavor” than commentators had suggested. Kossick v.
United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 742 (1961).
10. See W. Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 242 (1921) (allowing a state statute governing
wrongful death to apply because the matter was “maritime and local in character”). See also
Ernest A. Young, The Last Brooding Omnipresence: Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins and the
Unconstitutionality of Preemptive Federal Maritime Law, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1349, 1361–62
(1999) (arguing that the “maritime but local” doctrine is one of five frameworks that the Supreme
Court adopts to explain when state law will apply and that there is very little guidance as to which
framework will apply).
11. See Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 221–22 (1986) (noting that
claims can be brought in federal court or state court, but that the “reverse-Erie” doctrine requires
that the states conform to maritime principles).
12. See TAG/ICIB Servs. Inc. v. Pan Am. Grain Co., 215 F.3d 172, 175–76 (1st Cir. 2000)
(finding that laches will bar the pursuit of a stale claim when there is no applicable statute of
limitations).
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course, is whether American or foreign law applies to the controversy. In
some cases, the fact that the matter is maritime may dictate that foreign law,
and not American law, should prevail in American courts.13 This often
requires an understanding of international law and the impact and validity of
treaties. Even where American law will prevail, American courts charged with
the task of fashioning American maritime law may be inclined to have that law
comport with the reasonable expectations of the law in other countries. Thus,
as indicated earlier, the general maritime law is extremely important, but not
controlling, in determining American maritime law.
There are many important legal concepts that one must master both in
admiralty and in other areas of the law. Two important lessons to be learned in
American admiralty law are the concepts of preemption and comity.
Determining whether American maritime law applies may require an
interpretation of statutes and, most importantly, a determination and
appreciation of the societal policies that may lead a court to rule that maritime
law should or should not apply. Where the grant to the federal sovereign of
maritime jurisdiction does compel litigation in a federal court and/or
application of a national substantive rule, a court generally may conclude that
maritime law applies and preempts any otherwise applicable state law.14
Where the federal interests in the promotion of maritime shipping and
commerce are not strong enough, however, a court may determine that
although the matter is “in admiralty,” that law should not preempt the
otherwise applicable law of a state with a great interest in the outcome of the
controversy.15 Here, one may deem the issue “maritime but local,”16 and
comity may dictate that the court apply state law. Where more than one state
has an interest in the outcome, a court that has deemed the matter “maritime
but local” applies the general principles of conflict of laws.17 In such a case,
however, the conflict rule may not be a state rule but the federal admiralty
conflicts rule.18
Importantly, the admiralty student must constantly delve into the societal
policies that may be afoot in a given situation. The traditional ones, such as

13. See Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 308–09 (1970) (holding that a court
must consider the national interest); Neely v. Club Med Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 63 F.3d 166, 174 (3d
Cir. 1995) (articulating a multi-factor test, and concluding that the test determined choice of law,
not jurisdiction).
14. See S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 217–18 (1917) (holding that maritime law
preempted state workers’ compensation remedies).
15. See Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 201–02 (1996) (holding where the
plaintiff’s wrongful death claim arose out of a recreational jet ski accident, state wrongful death
remedies were not completely displaced by maritime law).
16. Id. at 207 (citing W. Fuel v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 242 (1921)).
17. See Morcher v. Nash, 26 F. Supp. 2d 758, 763–64 (D.V.I. 1998).
18. Aqua-Marine Constructors, Inc. v. Banks, 110 F.3d 663, 670 (9th Cir. 1997).
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deterrence of undesirable conduct, encouragement of desirable conduct, and
satisfaction of the community’s sense of justice, come easily to mind.
However, with maritime law, one must also consider other important policy
issues, including what conduct is desirable and undesirable and what is
considered just to those who “go down to the sea in ships”19 (or send their
physical and financial fortunes “down to the sea”).
The American admiralty student and lawyer must be introduced to, and
become familiar with, some legally unusual and unique admiralty concepts and
the extent to which those concepts differ from the general American law. Such
things as limitation of liability (a version of partial instant bankruptcy)20 and
The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act21 are examples that must be understood.
Further, where a matter is deemed “in admiralty,” even if state substantive
law will apply, the student must delve into the procedural rules that govern
admiralty claims.22 This requires a solid knowledge of federal court subject
matter jurisdiction and includes not just federal question and diversity
jurisdiction, but admiralty jurisdiction—i.e., a federal court has subject matter
jurisdiction over the claim simply because it is a maritime claim.23 In such
cases, the existence of other federal substantive law or diversity of citizenship
usually is irrelevant. When a maritime claim is brought in federal court on the
basis of admiralty jurisdiction, the general Federal Rules of Procedure and
Federal Rules of Evidence apply, but there are important procedures (such as
the pure in rem action)24 that may govern the outcome.
Even where the admiralty claim is brought in state court, certain federal
admiralty procedural rules may apply in lieu of the state’s general rule. In
addition, much of the admiralty subject matter jurisdiction is exclusive,
meaning that suit in some other court, or in federal court on some other basis
of jurisdiction, will be improper and may not interrupt the running of the
statute of limitations on the claims on which suit is brought.25

19. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 104 (1946) (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
20. Statutory limitations exist in admiralty to protect ship-owners from certain claims, debts,
and liabilities. 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501–30512 (2006).
21. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, ch. 229, 49 Stat. 1207 (1936) (current version at 46
U.S.C. § 30701 (2006)).
22. FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP. R. A–E.
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (2006) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction,
exclusive of the courts of the States, of: Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction,
saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.”).
24. FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP. R. C.
25. See Wilson v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 939 F.2d 260, 268 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding that the
Jones Act’s statute of limitations is not tolled by filing a LHWCA claim).
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I. WHEN TO TEACH ADMIRALTY
The first year, of course, is out. In the second year, the student should
have acquired the skill and some of the background needed to fathom the
numerous legal ramifications inherent in admiralty law. The preference may
be the third year, since the student by that time should have a background in
local substantive law (tort, contract, and worker injury claims), an exposure to
federal courts and evidence, and a better grasp of the balance of societal
policies that may govern the applicable rules of law.
One of the author’s most effective classes in admiralty was composed of
two kinds of students, the third-year law student and the practicing attorney.
The attorneys (about one-third of the class) brought much enthusiasm,
knowledge of the importance of the subject, and insight into the practical
aspects of the process of litigation. This impressed upon many of the thirdyear students the importance of the subject and the need to continue the
mastery of special subjects after law school.
In some law schools, the curriculum will encompass only a single course in
American admiralty law or none at all. Some schools offer multiple courses,
such as dividing maritime personal injury and carriage of goods into separate
courses. A law faculty should take care, however, to ensure that the student
has the opportunity to take the many other general courses that prepare him or
her for general practice and for an understanding of all of the aspects of
maritime law.
II. HOW TO TEACH ADMIRALTY
The materials used to teach admiralty may depend upon the kind of
maritime law that the student can reasonably be expected to encounter as an
attorney, generally in the geographical area of the particular law school or the
area that the student reasonably may be expected to practice. In Louisiana,
where maritime personal injury is of extreme importance and the cases
comparatively are many, the classroom materials should emphasize admiralty
torts and worker compensation (including, of course, seamen’s remedies, the
Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA)26 and state
worker compensation), and the interaction among these worker injury areas. In
other areas where commercial maritime litigation is relevant, the materials
generally should emphasize maritime contract law, primarily the carriage of
goods through bills of lading (the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act27 and the
Harter Act28) and by charter. There are a number of admiralty casebooks
issued through national publishers, and the content varies with the teacher’s

26. Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901–950 (2006).
27. See Carriage of Goods by the Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30701 (2006).
28. Act of Feb. 13, 1893 (the Harter Act), 46 U.S.C. §§ 30701–30707 (2006).
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predilections and the type of maritime law that will be emphasized in the
course. The preferable casebook includes an ample collection of all the
materials, with a teaching manual that will aid the instructor in the emphasis
and de-emphasis of certain materials during the course. Another good source
is the literature, much of which is published regularly in admiralty and
maritime journals. Of course, there is so much unresolved maritime law that
the instructors should keep abreast of recent developments, such as United
States Supreme Court decisions and new or amended federal maritime statutes.
There is a wealth of statutory material, both in admiralty tort law and
admiralty contract law. The most important contract provisions can be
reproduced in the textbook or may be gathered in a statutory supplement to the
casebook. Where a statutory supplement is used, statutes that are of secondary
importance and which may detract from the limited time available to the
instructor and student for coverage of the basic and crucial materials should be
eliminated.Some themes, such as “maritime but local,” pervade many areas of
admiralty law. The materials should emphasize, and the students should be
instructed to compare and synthesize, the same theme (and policy choice) as it
appears in entirely different areas of substantive American admiralty law.
Of course, the casebook method is essential. However, cases should be
carefully selected and evaluated, with the footnotes that follow (or the
introductions that precede them), also suggesting: 1) where the case opinion is
written by the United States Supreme Court, any ramifications or extensions
that are likely to arise; and 2) where the case is from a lower court, the extent
to which the case represents the majority lower court view and whether there
are any differing lower court views.
Because of the comprehensiveness of the subject and the importance of the
student’s understanding of the manner in which the various rules may apply,
the problem approach, particularly near the end of the course, can be most
helpful. Thus, a fact situation in which a key issue is whether water is
navigable can be used to raise or promote discussion of other issues of
maritime tort law, worker injury (seaman, LHWCA or state worker
compensation) rules, and contract principles (repair or provision of goods and
services).
The student and, unfortunately, the admiralty proctor often fail to
distinguish between the substantive rules that govern maritime law and the
applicable procedural requirements, including, primarily, subject matter
jurisdiction. The distinction should be emphasized at the outset of the
student’s study of maritime law and reemphasized often during the course of
study. For example, the introduction to the federal grant of admiralty power
under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution29 should be followed by a

29. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
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discussion of the Judiciary Act of 1789.30 The distinction should be
emphasized again in discussing other aspects of maritime law, including the
“maritime but local doctrine,” which bears heavily on substantive maritime law
but generally is of less importance (and is not even used, terminology-wise), in
the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal and state courts.
A student may achieve a better understanding of maritime law by being
required to, or given the option to, prepare a written paper for all or part of the
final grade. If the topic is controversial, the student may better appreciate the
societal policies that drive the particular topic of maritime law and maritime
law in general. The student also may be required to present a verbal
summation of his topic and the conclusions he has reached, although such
summations should be brief and should not be a mere recitation of the contents
of the paper. Depending upon the topic, a student may be permitted to consult
with a practicing attorney or judge, and may garner from this informal
“mentor” a better appreciation of the topic and a better understanding of how
admiralty law generally is treated “in the trenches.” The summations may be
provided in advance to other students, who should be given the opportunity to
critique the presentations and learn the subjects in greater depth.
Practicing attorneys and judges may also be of invaluable assistance in the
teaching of certain topics of maritime law that impact heavily on the substance,
such as the litigant’s selection of a judge or a jury. In some cases (such as
admiralty jurisdiction under Title 28 U.S.C. § 1333),31 there is no choice. But
in most cases, there may be a choice; that choice initially falls with the
plaintiff, but in many cases the defendant has the option, primarily through
removal. Even the student who has been exposed to removal in another course
can benefit from the interesting removal issues often presented by maritime
claims. In addition, the student here may be given some understanding of the
predilections of juries and of judges as to certain types of claims in certain
jurisdictions and of the need to ascertain, to the extent possible, the
predilections of a particular judge. Of course, the student should be made
cognizant of the perceived prepossesions to maritime law of the Supreme
Court justices and judges of the applicable federal court of appeals or state
supreme court.
A concomitant of this topic is forum selection, an important aspect of
maritime practice. A thorough admiralty course should include limitations on
choice of law and on choice of forum and the extent to which the litigants may
make those selections by choice of courts or by pre-suit contract.

30. Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77 (1789).
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2006); See also Fitzgerald v. U.S. Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20 (1963)
(“[The Supreme] Court has held that the Seventh Amendment does not require jury trials in
admiralty cases, . . .”) (citing Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441, 460 (1847)).
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A course in maritime law may be structured in such a way as to give the
student a better understanding of the concept of immunity. The maritime
student should be exposed to international immunity and the American
experience, including the Tate letter (in which the executive department
determined whether a foreign sovereign was immune from suit in American
courts),32 the subsequent Congressional restrictions on sovereign immunity,33
and the current status of such immunity through judicial interpretation of the
Congressional restrictions.34 The waiver of federal sovereign immunity in
maritime law (primarily the Suits in Admiralty Act35 and the Public Vessels
Act36) provides a comparison for the general federal waiver of sovereign
immunity through the Federal Tort Claims Act,37 an often overlooked subject
in law school. Similarly overlooked is the state’s sovereign immunity in
federal court, in the state’s own courts, and in the courts of other states. This
last issue provides another example of how the concept of comity often
compels judicial decisions.
Learning and teaching American maritime law requires basic knowledge of
many other aspects of law, including international law, federal constitutional
law, the relationship between federal and state laws, and the myriad of state
law rules that govern contracts, torts, and worker’s injury claims. It also
requires “landlubbers” like this author to develop a friendly relationship with
the special rules that govern the operation of vessels on navigable waters.
Equally important is the fact that many issues have not been resolved, and
unprecedented events, such as the Gulf of Mexico explosion in April 2010,38
generally will prompt significant statutory and jurisprudential changes in
American maritime law. The admiralty student and the admiralty teacher

32. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Dep’t Acting Legal Advisor, to Attorney Gen. Philip B.
Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP’T ST. BULL. 984, 985 (1952).
33. See The Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30901–30918 (2006); The Public Vessels
Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 31101–31113 (2006) (waiving the United States’s sovereign immunity from
suits for admiralty claims). See also the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671–
2680 (2006) (waiving the sovereign immunity for tortious acts committed by federal employees).
See also Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–1611 (2006)
(determining the extent to which American courts will give international sovereigns immunity).
34. See, e.g., McCormick v. United States, 680 F.2d 345, 349, 351 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding
that any claim that can be brought under the Suits in Admiralty Act is barred under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, and that the two year statute of limitations period in the Suits in Admiralty Act
is subject to tolling); China Nat’l Chem. Imp. & Exp. Corp. v. M.V. Lago Hualaihue, 504 F.
Supp. 684, 689–90 (D. Md. 1981) (holding that FSIA was intended to include claims arising out
of collisions).
35. 46 U.S.C. §§ 30903–30918.
36. Id. §§ 31102–31113.
37. 28 U.S.C. § 2674.
38. See Matthew L. Wald, Clarifying Questions of Liability, Cleanup and Consequences,
N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2010, at A19.
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(who, of course, is a perpetual student of the subject) always are presented with
adequate challenges and the opportunity to apply his or her general knowledge
of law to the particular maritime problem. It can be one of the most rewarding
of legal accomplishments.
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